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Abstract
Exponential runtimes of algorithms for TU-values like the Shapley value are one of the
biggest obstacles in the practical application of otherwise axiomatically convincing solu-
tion concepts of cooperative game theory. We discuss how the hierarchical structure of
a level structure improves the runtimes compared to an unstructured set of players. As
examples, we examine the Shapley levels value, the nested Shapley levels value, and, as a
new LS-value, the nested Owen levels value. Polynomial-time algorithms for these values
(under ordinary conditions) are provided. Furthermore, we introduce relevant coalition
functions where all coalitions which are not relevant for the payoff calculation have a
Harsanyi dividend of zero. By these coalition functions, our results shed new light on the
computation of values of the Harsanyi set and many values from extensions of this set.
Keywords Cooperative game · Polynomial-time algorithm · Level structure · (Nested)
Shapley/Owen (levels) value · Harsanyi dividends
1 Introduction
Since the introduction of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953b), many cooperative game
theorists have accumulated an ever-growing pool of axiomatizations of values for cooper-
ative games with transferable utility (TU-values). These axiomatizations offer convincing
arguments for one or the other TU-value in a variety of situations and applications. But
what use is the most beautiful model if the complexity, even for small applications, is
so high that they cannot be computed in applicable time or if not all necessary data is
available or can be captured?
Within economics, the important concept of bounded rationality (Simon, 1972) means
that rationally acting individuals must take limited information and cognitive limitations
into account in their choices. The time required for decision-making and the limited
computing capacity must also be considered. In this respect, we refer, for example, to
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2Futia (1977), Rubinstein (1986), or Kalai and Stanford (1988). Bounded rationality,
therefore, requires that in deciding which value should we use for the payoff calculation
in practice, computational ease has always to be satisfied. From a complexity theory
perspective, computational ease for a TU value implies that the payoff can be calculated
efficiently (i.e. in polynomial-time with respect to the number of players).
Take, e.g., the Shapley value as a central single-valued solution concept. Usually, when
computing the Shapley value, the worths of all possible coalitions of players have to be
considered. In other words, if n is the number of players, we get an exponential runtime
in n, since we have 2n − 1 many different coalitions.1
However, several classes of coalition functions are known for which we can compute
payoffs in polynomial-time using the Shapley value. For example, formulas exist for
airport games (Littlechild and Owen, 1973) and for k-games (van Den Nouweland et al.,
1996), which coincide with weighted hypergraph games with hyperedges of size k (Deng
and Papadimitriou, 1993), which require only a selection of all coalitions for computation.
Since the number of these coalitions is polynomial in n, the payoff computations can be
done efficiently.
For the Shapley levels value (Winter, 1989), Winter introduced a hierarchical structure
of coalitions, called level structure, which is related to the tree data structure. A level
structure comprises a series of ordered partitions (the levels) of the player set, each higher
level being coarser than the previous one, i.e., each component of a higher level contains
at least one or more components of the previous level which together contain the same
players (see Figures 1, 2, and 3). Therefore, a level structure can also be seen as an
extension of a coalition structure (Aumann and Dre`ze, 1974; Owen, 1977) which has only
three levels if we count the partition containing all singletons and the partition containing
only the grand coalition as levels.
Meanwhile, some different values for level structures (LS-values) exist, like the six values
for level structures in Chantreuil (2001), the value for level structures in Go´mez-Ru´a
and Vidal-Puga (2011), the Banzhaf levels value in Alvarez-Mozos and Tejada (2011),
or the class of weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values (Besner, 2019b) which contain
also the Shapley levels value and the just mentioned LS-value from Go´mez-Ru´a and
Vidal-Puga. Sastre and Trannoy (2002) suggested an extension of their nested Shapley
value2 to level structures which we call nested Shapley levels value. We find a somewhat
different approach in Sa´nchez-Sa´nchez and Vargas-Valencia (2018), who proposed a value
for cooperative nested games which satisfy nested constraints on a level structure. This
value can be seen as an extension of the collective value in Kamijo (2013) for coalition
structures.
In this study, we take advantage of the tree-like structure of level structures to obtain
algorithms for LS-values which have a polynomial runtime. We investigate the Shapley
levels value, the nested Shapley levels value, and as a new LS-value, the nested Owen
levels value. Similar to the Shapley levels value, we can this value also interpret as an
extension of the Owen value (Owen, 1977) to LS-values. For ordinary level structures,
1That means that, aside from the huge amount of data we have to manage, we are already reaching our
limits here with a set of maybe 50 players. Purely theoretically, a 3.4 Ghz processor needs already about
92 hours for 250 calculation steps (elementary operations). Even a processor 1000 times faster could
only cope with a set of log2 1000 ≈ 10 players more at the same time.
2Kamijo (2009) called this value two-step Shapley value.
3meaning that there are no redundant levels and the number of sub-components within a
component is bounded by a fixed degree, we get polynomial runtimes for algorithms for
the last two LS-values mentioned above. If we additionally require that each component
of a higher level contains at least two subcomponents in the lower ones, we also obtain a
polynomial-time algorithm for the Shapley levels value.
The decisive factor in getting polynomial runtimes is that not all coalitions have to be
taken into account in the payoff calculation. We call these coalitions relevant coalitions.
All other coalitions can take any worth, and we still get the same payoff. This leads us to
introduce relevant coalition functions where the relevant coalitions receive their original
worth and the other coalitions receive a worth so that their Harsanyi dividend (Harsanyi,
1959) is zero. Harsanyi dividends can be seen as the cooperation benefits of one coalition
over the cooperation benefits of its subcoalitions.
Using relevant coalition functions, we also obtain polynomial runtimes for the Shapley
levels value, under the above conditions, if we use the well-known formula with dividends
in Calvo et al. (1996, Eq.(1)) as the basis for an algorithm. It turns out that games with
relevant coalition functions are closely related to the weighted hypergraph games with
variable-size hyperedges, mentioned in Deng and Papadimitriou (1993).
By adapting an algorithm in Algaba et al. (2007), we can compute the dividends of
relevant coalitions for a relevant coalition function in polynomial-time if the coalitions
are known and their number is polynomially bounded. Thus, we obtain algorithms with
polynomial runtime for values with a dividend representation like the values from the
Harsanyi set (Hammer et al., 1977; Vasil’ev, 1978) or the proportional Shapley value
(Be´al et al., 2018; Besner, 2019a) if we know all coalitions with positive or negative
dividends and their number is polynomially bounded.
The aim of this paper is not to present highly polished algorithms but to show in
principle under which circumstances polynomial runtimes can be achieved. To legitimize
the introduced nested Owen levels value and the nested Shapley levels value in cooperative
game theory, we provide simple axiomatizations in the spirit of balanced contributions as
in Calvo et al. (1996).
The paper is organized as follows. Some preliminaries are given in Section 2, Section 3
confirms the exponential runtime of the Shapley value in general and offers some classes of
coalition functions, where the Shapley value can be computed efficiently, in Section 4, three
LS-values are presented with a short axiomatization, Section 5 provides algorithms with
polynomial runtime for LS-values, in Section 6, we introduce relevant coalition functions
and a new formula with dividends for the Shapley levels value, Section 7 generalizes our
results, and Section 8 concludes and discusses some ideas for future work. An appendix
(Section 9) contains all the proofs required for axiomatizations of the LS-values and
Theorem 7.3.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 TU-games
Given a countably infinite set U, the universe of players, we denote by N the set of all
finite subsets of U. A TU-game (N, v) consists of a player set N ∈ N and a coalition
function v : 2N→ R, v(∅) = 0. Each subset S ⊆ N is called a coalition. v(S) is called
4the worth from S, ΩS denotes the set of all non-empty subsets of S, and (S, v) is the
restriction of (N, v) to S ∈ ΩN. We denote by n := |N | the cardinality of N and the set
of all TU-games (N, v) is denoted by VN. A game (N, uS), S ∈ Ω
N, defined for all T ⊆ N
by uS(T ) = 1 if S ⊆ T and uS = 0 otherwise, is called an unanimity game. For all
S ⊆ N , the Harsanyi dividends ∆v(S) (Harsanyi, 1959) are defined inductively by
∆v(S) :=
{
0, if S = ∅,
v(S)−
∑
R(S ∆v(R), otherwise.
(1)
S ⊆ N is called essential in v if ∆v(S) 6= 0. A player i ∈ N is called a dummy player in
v if v(S∪{i}) = v(S)+v({i}), S ⊆ N\{i}. If we have additionally v({i}) = 0, the dummy
player i is called a null player. Two players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, are called symmetric in v,
if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
A TU-value or solution φ is an operator that assigns to any (N, v) ∈ VN a payoff
vector φ(N, v) ∈ RN. For all (N, v) ∈ VN, the Shapley value Sh (Shapley, 1953b) is
defined by
Shi(N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,
S∋i
(|S| − 1)! (n− |S|)!
n!
[
v(S)− v(S\{i})
]
for all i ∈ N. (2)
A well-known equivalent formula for the Shapley value is given by
Shi(N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S∋i
∆v(S)
|S|
for all i ∈ N. (3)
We refer to the following axioms for TU-values φ on VN.
Efficiency0, E0. For all (N, v) ∈ VN, we have
∑
i∈N φi(N, v) = v(N).
Dummy player0, D0. For all (N, v) ∈ VN and i ∈ N a dummy player in v, we have
φi(N, v) = 0.
Additivity0, A0. For all (N, v), (N,w) ∈ VN, we have φ(N, v) + φ(N,w) = φ(N, v + w).
Balanced contributions0, BC0 (Myerson, 1980). For all (N, v) ∈ VN and i, j ∈ N , we
have φi(N, v)− φi(N\{j}, v) = φj(N, v)− φj(N\{i}, v):
Symmetry0, S0. For all (N, v) ∈ VN, and i, j ∈ N such that i and j are symmetric in v,
we have φi(N, v) = φj(N, v).
2.2 LS-games
In this subsection, some definitions and notations will follow with Besner (2019b). A
partition B := {B1, ..., Bm} of a player set N ∈ N , i.e., Bk 6= ∅ for all k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m,
Bk ∩ Bℓ = ∅, 1 ≤ k < ℓ ≤ m, and
⋃m
k=1Bk = N , is called a coalition structure on N .
Each B ∈ B is called a component and B(i) denotes the component that contains the
player i ∈ N .
For any N ∈ N , a level structure (Winter, 1989) on N , is a finite sequence B :=
{B0, ...,Bh+1} of coalition structures Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h+1, on N such that B0 =
{
{i}: i ∈ N
}
,
Bh+1 = {N}, and Br+1 is coarser than Br for each r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, i. e., Br(i) ⊆ Br+1(i) for
5all i ∈ N . For each r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h+1, Br denotes the r-th level of B. We denote by B the
set of all components B ∈ Br of all levels Br ∈ B, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, and LN denotes the set of
all level structures with player set N .
For B ∈ Bk, 0 ≤ k ≤ r ≤ h + 1, Br(B) denotes the component of the r-th level that
contains as a (not necessary proper) subset the component B and is called an ancestor of
B, if k < r. If r = k+1, we call the ancestor also parent of B. All components with the
same parent B ∈ Br, 1 ≤ r ≤ h + 1, are called children of B and two different children
of B are called siblings in Br−1. Note that a component B can be its own parent or
child (in different levels). For Bk ∈ B
r, we define 〈Bk〉
r := {B : B is a child of Br+1(Bk)}
as the set of all children of Br+1(Bk) if 0 ≤ r ≤ h, and 〈Bk〉
r := {N} if r = h + 1. By
| 〈Bk〉
r |, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, we denote the degree of the component Br+1(Bk). The degree
of a level structure B is the maximal degree of all components B ∈ (B ∪ {N}) which
are also parents.
Keep in mind that the definition of level structures also allows identical consecutive
levels. A level structure B is called strict if Br(i) ( Br+1(i) for all r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, and at
least one i ∈ N , possibly different for each level (see Figure 1), we call B totally strict
if Br(i) ( Br+1(i) for all r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, and all i ∈ N (see Figure 2). Note that for a strict
level structure we have n ≥ 2. If in a strict level structure of degree 2 at least one child
of each component that is also a parent is a singleton, we call it degenerate strict (see
Figure 3).
{1} {2} {3} {4} {5} {6} {7} {8} {9} {10} {11}
{1,2} {3,4,5} {6,7} {8} {9,10,11}
{1,2,3,4,5} {6,7,8} {9,10,11}
{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11}
Level: 3
2
1
0
Figure 1: Structure of the components of a strict level structure in different levels
An LS-game is a triple (N, v,B) consisting of a TU-game (N, v) ∈ VN and a level
structure B ∈ LN. We denote the set of all LS-games on N by VLN.
We define Br :=
{
Br
0
, ...,Br
h+1−r}
∈ LB
r
, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, as the induced rth level
structure from B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}. In this context, we regard the components B ∈ Br
as players. Each element of a coalition structure Br
k
:=
{
{B ∈ Br : B ⊆ B′} : for all B′ ∈
Br+k
}
, 0 ≤ k ≤ h + 1 − r, is a set of all components of the r-th level which are subsets
of the same component of the (r + k)-th level.
(
Br, vr,Br
)
∈ VLB
r
is called the induced
rth level game from B and is given by
vr(Q) := v(
⋃
B∈Q
B) for all Q ⊆ Br.
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{1,2} {3,4,5} {6,7} {8,9} {10,11}
{1,2,3,4,5} {6,7,8,9,10,11}
{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11}
Level: 3
2
1
0
Figure 2: Structure of the components of a totally strict level structure in different levels
{1} {2} {3} {4} {5} {6}
{1,2} {3} {4} {5} {6}
{1,2,3} {4} {5} {6}
{1,2,3,4} {5} {6}
{1,2,3,4,5} {6}
{1,2,3,4,5,6} Level: 5
4
3
2
1
0
Figure 3: Structure of the components of a degenerate strict level structure in different levels
For T ∈ ΩN and coalition structures Br|T := {B∩T : B∈ B
r, B∩T 6= ∅}, 0 ≤ r ≤ h+1, we
denote by B|T := {B
0|T , ...,B
h+1|T} ∈ L
T the restricted level structure of B on T . Then,
(T, v,B|T ) ∈ VL
T is called the restriction of (N, v,B) to T and
(
Br|T , v
r,Br|T
)
∈ VLB
r|T
is the induced rth level game from the restriction of (N, v,B) ∈ VLN on T .
For 0 ≤ r ≤ h, Br :=
{
B0, ...,Br, {N}
}
∈ LN is called the rth cut level structure from
B where all levels between the rth and the (h+ 1)th level are cut out from B. (N, v,Br)
is called the rth cut of (N, v,B). Notice that for each B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} we also have
B = Bh. Thus, for a level structure B = {B
0, ...,Bh+1} we often write briefly B = Bh
to make clear how many levels the level structure comprises. For each (N, v,B) ∈ VLN
with a trivial level structure B = B0 exists a corresponding TU-game (N, v) and for
each (N, v,B) ∈ VLN with B = B1 exists a corresponding game with coalition structure
(Aumann and Dre`ze, 1974; Owen, 1977).
An LS-value ϕ is an operator that assigns to any (N, v, B) ∈ VLN a payoff vector
ϕ(N, v, B) ∈ RN. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, T ∈ Ω
N, T ∋ i, and
7KT (i) :=
h∏
r=0
KrT (i), where K
r
T (i) :=
1
|{B ∈ Br : B⊆ Br+1(i), B ∩ T 6= ∅}|
. (4)
The Shapley Levels value ShL (Winter, 1989) is defined by3
ShLi (N, v,B) :=
∑
T⊆N,T∋i
KT (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N. (5)
If h = 0, ShL coincides with Sh; if h = 1, a level structure coincides with a coalition
structure and it is well-known, that the Owen value Ow (Owen, 1977) can therefore
alternatively, as a special case of the level structure value, be defined by
Owi(N, v,B1) :=
∑
T⊆N,T∋i
KT (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N.
We refer to the following axioms for LS-values ϕ on VLN.
Efficiency, E. For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, we have
∑
i∈N ϕi(N, v,B) = v(N).
Null player, N. For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN and i ∈ N a null player in v, we have
ϕi(N, v,B) = 0.
Level game property, LG (Winter, 1989). For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, B ∈
Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, we have ∑
i∈B
ϕi(N, v,B) = ϕB(B
r, vr,Br).
This property states that the total payoff obtained by all members of a component is
equal to the component’s payoff in the corresponding level game where the component is
regarded as a player.
Balanced contributions, BC (Calvo et al., 1996). For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh,
and two siblings Bk, Bℓ ∈ B
r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, we have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N\Bℓ, v,B|N\Bℓ) =
∑
i∈Bℓ
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈Bℓ
ϕi(N\Bk, v,B|N\Bk).
BC means that for any two siblings, the sum of the amount that all players of one sibling
would win or lose if the other sibling is eliminated from the game should be the same for
both siblings.
2.3 Time complexity
By time complexity we understand an estimation of the time to run an algorithm. Usually,
the time is specified by the number of elementary operations the algorithm needs to
execute. For simplicity’s sake, a fixed constant time is assumed for each elementary
operation. If we are interested in an upper bound, the worst-case time complexity, we
use big-O notation. In case that we are interested in a lower bound, we use the big-Ω
notation as suggested by Knuth (1976). Normally, the argument of the function used
3This formula for the Shapley levels value comes from Calvo et al. (1996, Eq.(1)).
8within the big-O or the big-Ω notation is the input size. In this respect, we cite Deng
and Papadimitriou (1993) who stated the following:
“There is a catch, however: If the game is defined by the 2n coalition values, there may
be little to be said about the computational complexity of the various solution concepts,
because the input is already exponential in n, and thus, in most cases, the computational
problems above can be solved very ‘efficiently’.”
It is therefore common practice in this context, to use the number of players as the
reference for the time complexity analysis. Hence we say that an algorithm is efficient if
it runs in polynomial-time with respect to the number n of players.
Notation 2.1. By t(A) we denote the number of elementary operations of algorithm A,
by t(Fr) those within the for-loop starting in line r, by t(Lr) those of the assignments
within line r, and by t(IFr) and t(ELSEr) those within the if- or else-branch starting in
line r.
3 The Shapley value
If we look at formulas (2) or (3) for computing the Shapley value, we see that even the
input of the used worths or dividends requires exponential time. But are we perhaps
simply not yet able to find an algorithm that does not need the worths of all coalitions
for the input? We will see later that for the Shapley levels value, which has with formula
(5) a very similar formula to formula (3), a formula can be found which, except in degen-
erated cases, only requires the worths of polynomially many coalitions. Whether linear
programs can be solved in polynomial-time has long been an open problem, especially
when it became clear that the simplex algorithm as the main solution method requires
exponential time. Finally, the ellipsoid algorithm in Khachiyan (1979) showed that linear
programs are solvable in polynomial-time. However, the fact that generally no algorithm
with polynomial-time can be found for the Shapley value is confirmed by the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.1. There is no algorithm that computes the Shapley value in polynomial-
time for all (N, v) ∈ VN and N ∈ N with respect to the number of players n.
Proof. Let N ∈ N , (N, v1), (N, v2) ∈ V
N, K ⊆ N , v1(K) 6= v2(K) and v1(S) = v2(S) for
all S ∈ ΩN\{K}, such that each worth v1(S), v2(S) is independent from all other worths
v1(T ), v2(T ), T ∈ Ω
N\{S}. By (2), we have, for all i ∈ K,
Shi(N, v2)− Shi(N, v1)
=
∑
S⊆N,
S∋i
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
[
v2(S)− v2(S\{i})
]
−
∑
S⊆N,
S∋i
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
[
v1(S)− v1(S\{i})
]
=
(k − 1)!(n− k)!
n!
[
v2(K)− v1(K)
]
6= 0,
where k := |K| and s := |S|. In other words, any algorithm that computes the Shapley
value returns a different result for the two coalition functions v1, v2. Therefore, since K
was arbitrary, the payoff to a player i depends on each worth of the 2n−1 coalitions S ⊆ N
9containing the player i as long as the worths of the coalitions are independent of each
other. Consequently, all worths must be used at least once in the algorithm, i.e. they
require at least one elementary operation, which corresponds to a runtime of Ω(2n−1) for
a single player.
Fortunately, there are some classes of games where the Shapley value can be computed
efficiently. Airport games are one possibility, as shown in Littlechild and Owen (1973).
This type of cost games can be decomposed into a sum of games where all players are
symmetric or null players. Therefore, here the additive Shapley value can be calculated
very efficiently by symmetry and the null player property of the value.
Another possibility are k-games, introduced by van Den Nouweland et al. (1996). A
k-game coincides to a weighted hypergraph game with hyperedges of size k, introduced by
Deng and Papadimitriou (1993). A TU-game is called a k-game if the coalition function
takes the form:
v(S) =
∑
T⊆S, |T |=k
v(T ), k ≥ 0.
As long as k is fixed and thus does not depend on n, we can compute the Shapley value
for such games in polynomial-time. This aspect is discussed in more detail in Section 7.
4 Values for level structures
In this section, we examine LS-values that generalize the Shapley value to LS-games
and calculate the payoff in a top-down procedure: We distribute the worth of the grand
coalition to its children, the components of the hth level, using a TU-value. Then, each
payoff of a component of the hth level is divided by the same TU-value among all its
children, and so on for all levels. Finally, we distribute the payoffs of the first level
components to their children and so to the original players. The various LS-values differ
in the definition of the intermediate games4.
4.1 The Shapley levels value as a weighted Shapley hierarchy levels value
We recall the definition of the Shapley levels value as a special case of the weighted Shapley
hierarchy levels values (Besner, 2019b) and a related notation.
Notation 4.1. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, i ∈ N, and T ∈ Ω
Bk(i), 0 ≤ k ≤ h. We
denote by T ki := {B ∈ B
k : B ⊆ Bk+1(i), B 6= Bk(i)} ∪ {T} the set of all children of the
component Bk+1(i), where the child Bk(i) is replaced by coalition T .
Definition 4.2. (see Besner (2019b, Remark 3.5)) Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, i ∈ N,
and for all k, 0 ≤ k ≤ h, T ∈ ΩB
k(i), be T ki the set from Notation 4.1, and define v¯
h+1
i := v,
and v¯ki by
v¯ki (T ) := ShT (T
k
i , v˜
k
i ) for all T ∈ Ω
Bk(i),
4Owen (1977) called such a game quotient game.
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where v˜ki is specified recursively via
v˜ki (Q) := v¯
k+1
i (
⋃
S∈Q
S) for all Q ⊆ T ki .
Then the Shapley levels value ShL is given by
ShLi (N, v,B) := v¯
0
i ({i}) for all i ∈ N.
We use the following axiomatization as a starting point for further axiomatizations.
Theorem 4.3. (Calvo et al., 1996) ShL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E and BC.
4.2 The nested Shapley levels value
In many hierarchically structured organizations, it is common for the actors of a single
organizational unit to act only among themselves. Interaction across organizational units
only takes place at a higher level. The top-down payoff calculation of the following value
is based on this principle.
Definition 4.4. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, i ∈ N, v¯
h+1
i (N) := v(N), and for all
k, 0 ≤ k ≤ h, be v¯ki (B
k(i)) given by
v¯ki (B
k(i)) := ShBk(i)(B
k|Bk+1(i), v˜
k
i ), (6)
where v˜ki is specified recursively via
v˜ki (Q) :=
{
v¯k+1i (B
k+1(i)), if Q = Bk|Bk+1(i),
v(
⋃
B∈QB) if Q ( B
k|Bk+1(i).
(7)
Then the nested Shapley levels value ShNL, suggested in Sastre and Trannoy (2002),
is given by
ShNLi (N, v,B) := v¯
0
i ({i}) for all i ∈ N.
Remark 4.5. Due to the additivity of the Shapley value, we can interpret the top-down
distribution mechanism also in this way: Within each (parent) component, there is a
recursive two-step bargaining process. In a first step, the children divide as players in a
game, restricted to their parent, the original worth of the parent via the Shapley value.
In a second step, the surplus that the parent has received as a player over what it has
earned itself is additionally distributed evenly among the children. We obtain the following
equivalent definition that especially shows the coincidence of the value with the nested
Shapley value5 defined in Sastre and Trannoy (2002) in case of a level structure with
h = 1:
Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh. Then Sh
NL is recursively defined by
ShNLBk(i)(B
k, vk,Bk)
:=


ShBh(i)(B
h, vh), if k = h,
ShBk(i)(B
k|Bk+1(i), v
k) +
ShNL
Bk+1(i)
(Bk+1, vk+1,Bk+1)− v(Bk+1(i))
| 〈Bk(i)〉k |
, if 0 ≤ k < h,
(8)
and ShNLi (N, v, B) := Sh
NL
{i}(B
0, v0,B0) for all i ∈ N .
5Kamijo (2009) called this value two-step Shapley value.
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We introduce a new axiom that coincides obviously for a trivial level structure with BC.
Nested balanced contributions, NBC. For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, two siblings
Bk, Bℓ ∈ B
r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, we have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈Bk
ϕi
(
Br+1(i)\Bℓ, v,Br|Br+1(i)\Bℓ
)
=
∑
i∈Bℓ
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈Bℓ
ϕi
(
Br+1(i)\Bk, v,Br|Br+1(i)\Bk
)
.
An interpretation of this property would be as follows: The sum of the amount that all
players of one sibling would win or lose if the other sibling dropped out of the game and
this would result in a game then being played only within the parent component and no
longer on the entire level structure, should be the same for both siblings. Of course, the
higher redundant levels are then obsolete.
Proposition 4.6. ShNL satisfies E, LG, and NBC but not N.
We present an axiomatization of the nested Shapley levels value.
Theorem 4.7. ShNL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E and NBC.
To obtain the class of nested weighted Shapley levels values, we could also introduce
a weight system, similar as by the weighted Shapley hierarchy Shapley levels values, this
time only for all components, and replace the Shapley value in (6) with a corresponding
weighted Shapley value (Shapley,1953a). A nested weighted balanced contributions
axiom could be used for axiomatization. We will not go into that here.
4.3 The nested Owen levels value
We can now imagine that the active interaction of components which are siblings no longer
takes place only within the parent component, but also with the siblings of the parent
component or even with siblings of other ancestors. The extreme case is the Shapley levels
value that takes into account all ancestors and their siblings in the payoff calculation. In
the following LS value, we consider only the siblings of the parent component. The same
approach, restricted to a coalition structure, is used by Owen (1977) in his famous value.
Therefore, our LS-value, like the Shapley levels value, can be seen as an extension of the
Owen value to level structures. Again, we use a notation.
Notation 4.8. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, i ∈ N, S ⊆ B
k(i) be such that S =⋃
B∈Bk−1,B⊆SB is a union of children of B
k(i) if 1 ≤ k ≤ h, and S = {i} if k = 0. We
denote by Ski := {B ∈ B
k : B ⊆ Bk+1(i), B 6= Bk(i)} ∪ {S} the set containing all children
of the component Bk+1(i), where the child Bk(i) is replaced by coalition S.
Definition 4.9. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, i ∈ N, define v¯
h+1
i := v, and let v¯
k
i (S) for
all S ⊆ Bk(i), S =
⋃
B∈Bk−1,B⊆SB if 1 ≤ k ≤ h, or for S = {i} if k = 0, be given by
v¯ki (S) :=
{
ShS(B
k|Bk+1(i), v˜
k
i ), if S = B
k(i),
ShS(S
k
i , v
k
i ), S
k
i the set from Notation 4.8, otherwise,
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where vki is given by
vki (Q) := v(
⋃
T∈Q
T ) for all Q ⊆ Ski
and v˜ki is specified recursively via
v˜ki (Q) := v¯
k+1
i (
⋃
T∈Q
T ) for all Q ⊆ Bk|Bk+1(i).
Then the nested Owen levels value OwNL is given by
OwNLi (N, v,B) := v¯
0
i ({i}) for all i ∈ N.
Remark 4.10. Due to the additivity of the Shapley value (and thus of the Owen and
the nested Owen levels value), similar to the nested Shapley levels value, we can give an
alternative definition of the nested Owen levels value that justifies the naming. Within
each parent of a (parent) component B, a recursive two-step bargaining process is installed.
In a first step, all children of B receive as players in a game, restricted to the parent of B,
a share of the original worth of the parent of B via the Owen value. In a second step, the
surplus that B as a player on the whole game has received over what it has earned in the
restriction on its parent is additionally distributed evenly among the children of B. We
obtain the following equivalent definition, where Bkk+1|Bk+2(i) means the induced kth level
structure of the (k + 1)th cut of B|Bk+2(i):
Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh. Then Ow
NL is recursively defined by
OwNLBk(i)(B
k, vk,Bk)
:=


ShBh(i)(B
h, vh), if k = h,
OwBk(i)
(
Bk|Bk+2(i), v
k,Bkk+1|Bk+2(i)
)
+
OwNL
Bk+1(i)
(
Bk+1, vk+1,Bk+1
)
− ShBk+1(i)
(
Bk+1|Bk+2(i), v
k+1
)
| 〈Bk(i)〉k |
, if 0 ≤ k ≤ h− 1,
(9)
and OwNLi (N, v, B) = Ow
NL
{i}(B
0, v0,B0) for all i ∈ N .
Remark 4.11. OwNL coincides with Sh if h = 0 and with Ow if h = 1.
The following property is similar to NBC.
Nested balanced Owen contributions, NBOC. For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh,
two siblings Bk, Bℓ ∈ B
r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, we have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈Bk
ϕi
(
Br+2(i)\Bℓ, v,Br+1|Br+2(i)\Bℓ
)
=
∑
i∈Bℓ
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈Bℓ
ϕi
(
Br+2(i)\Bk, v,Br+1|Br+2(i)\Bk
)
, (10)
where Br+2(i) := Bh+1(i) and Br+1 := Bh if r = h.
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The interpretation is similar to NBC. Suppose one sibling leaves the game and this
would lead to a situation where the other sibling can only play a game within the parent
component of its parent (without its sibling). Then the sum of the payoffs that all players
of a sibling win or lose is the same for both siblings.
Proposition 4.12. OwNL satisfies E, LG, and NBOC but not N.
Theorem 4.13. OwNL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E and NBOC.
5 Runtime complexity for algorithms of LS-values
As far as we know, there are no studies of how the extension of a solution such as the
Shapley value to an LS value such as the Shapley levels value affects time complexity.
The hierarchical structure of level structures is related to the data structure of trees in
computer science or rooted trees in graph theory6. In computer science, trees are one of
the most fundamental concepts for coping with complexity. In this context, only the use
of trees in databases, hierarchical file systems in operating systems, or search trees for the
management of information should be mentioned.
We will show below that level structures can analogously reduce complexity. Since
identical levels do not bring any new information and all the LS-values examined here
give the same results when redundant levels are removed, in the following complexity
analyses, we will only consider strict level structures, at least with regard to the original
full player set.
Proposition 5.1. For each level structure B ∈ LN, B = Bh, we have
(i) h ≤ n− 2, if B is strict,
(ii) h ≤ (log2 n)− 1, if B is totally strict.
Proof. (i) For a strict level structure B ∈ LN, B = Bh, we have |B
r+1| < |Br| for all
r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h. Due to |B0| = n, it follows |Bh+1| ≤ n − (h + 1) and thus, by |Bh+1| = 1,
h ≤ n− 2.
(ii) Let B ∈ LN, B = Bh, be totally strict. If h = 0, we have 2
h+1 = 2 ≤ n. For each
additional level, the size of the player set must at least double. It follows, by induction
on the size h, 2h+1 ≤ n⇔ h ≤ (log2 n)− 1.
Next, we want to state that we only need the worths of certain coalitions for the compu-
tation of the LS-values that are computed in a top-down procedure.
Remark 5.2. To compute the Shapley levels value for a player i ∈ N and a level structure
B ∈ LN, based on Definition 4.2, we need only to take into account the worths of two groups
of coalitions T ⊆ N : first, all components B ∈ B, B ∋ i, and their siblings, and second,
all coalitions that these components can form as unions, so that for each of these coalitions
if any two components are involved in such a coalition, one component is an ancestor or
sibling of an ancestor of the other, or both components are siblings. We denote the set of
6In a different perspective, A´lvarez-Mozos et al. (2017) describe how hierarchical structures can be
transformed into level structures.
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all coalitions from these both groups by RiB as the set of relevant coalitions for player
i on B. The worths of all other coalitions S ∈ ΩN\RiB can take any worth and we get the
same payoff for player i.
Remark 5.3. To compute the nested Shapley levels value for a player i ∈ N and a level
structure B ∈ LN, based on Definition 4.4, we need only to take into account the worths
of two groups of coalitions T ⊆ N : first, all components B ∈ B, B ∋ i, and their siblings,
and second all coalitions that children within one parent, containing player i, can form as
unions among themselves. We denote the set of all coalitions from these both groups by
RShiB as the set of relevant nested Shapley coalitions for player i on B. The worths
of all coalitions S ∈ ΩN\RShiB can take any worth and we get the same payoff.
Remark 5.4. To compute a nested Owen levels value for a player i ∈ N and a level
structure B ∈ LN, based on Definition 4.9, we need only to take into account the worths of
three groups of coalitions T ⊆ N : first, all components B ∈ B, B ∋ i, and their siblings,
and second all coalitions that children within one parent, containing player i, can form as
unions among themselves, and third all coalitions that each of these coalitions can form
with siblings of their parent as unions. We denote the set of all coalitions from these three
groups by ROwiB as the set of relevant nested Owen coalitions for player i on B. The
worths of all coalitions S ∈ ΩN\ROwiB can take any worth and we get the same payoff.
If the degree of a level structure is not bounded, we cannot expect to find a polynomial-
time algorithm for our LS-values, since, e.g., all values for a trivial level structure coincide
with the Shapley value. Therefore, we use level structures of fixed degree for the algo-
rithms. First, we indicate the complexities of the intermediate games.
Theorem 5.5. Let (N, v) ∈ VN, D ∈ ΩN, and d := |D|. To compute Shi(D, v) for a
single player i ∈ D requires a time O(d2d).
Proof. By (2), we have the following algorithm.
Algorithm 5.1. Compute Shi(D, v)
Input: A player i ∈ D and v(S) for all S ⊆ D.
1: sum := 0
2: for all S ⊆ D, S ∋ i, do
3: sum := sum+
(|S| − 1)! (d− |S|)!
d!
[
v(S)− v(S\{i})
]
4: end for
5: Shi(D, v) := sum
6: return Shi(D, v).
Complexity: We have t(Algorithm 5.1) = 1+ t(F2)+ 1 = 2+2
d−1t(L3). If the faculties
are not stored, we have t(L3) ∈ O(d). Therefore, Algorithm 5.1 has a time O(d2
d).
Now we are ready to give the complexities of our LS-values.
Theorem 5.6. For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN such that B is a totally strict level structure of
degree d, it requires to compute ShLi (N, v,B) for all players i ∈ N a time O(n
d log n).
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Proof. We give a pseudocode algorithm based on Definition 4.2.
Algorithm 5.2. Compute ShLi (N, v,B)
Input: A level structure B ∈ LN, B = Bh, a player i ∈ N , and v(S) for all S ∈ R
i
B.
1: for all S ∈ RiB do // the relevant coalitions for player i
2: v¯h+1(S) := v(S)
3: end for
4: for k = h to 0 do // the descending levels
5: for all T ∈ ΩB
k(i) ∩RiB do // all subsets of component B
k(i) which are relevant
coalitions for player i
6: for all Q ⊆ T ki do // all subsets from T
k
i , defined in Notation 4.1
7: v˜ki (Q) := v¯
k+1
i (
⋃
S∈Q S)
8: end for
9: v¯ki (T ) := ShT (T
k
i , v˜
k
i ) // calls a method/function that computes Sh
before the assignment, e.g. Algorithm 5.1
10: end for
11: end for
12: ShLi (N, v,B) := v¯
0
i ({i})
13: return ShLi (N, v,B).
Complexity: Let B be a totally strict level structure of degree d. We have, by Proposi-
tion 5.1, h ≤ (log2 n)− 1. It follows
|RiB| ≤ 2
d · 2d−1 · · · 2d−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
h times
−1 ≤ 2 · 2d−1 · · · 2d−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
log2 n times
−1 = 2 · 2log2 n(d−1) − 1 = 2nd−1 − 1. (11)
In line 6, we have |T ki | ≤ d. It follows
t(F6) ≤ 2
d. (12)
Thus, we have
t(Algorithm 5.2) = t(F1) + t(F4) + 1 ≤
(11)
2nd−1 +
∑0
k=h t(F5)
≤
Prop.5.1
(11)
2nd−1 + (log2 n)2n
d−1
[
t(F6) + t(L9)
]
≤
(12)
2nd−1 + (log2 n)2n
d−12d + (log2 n)2n
d−1t(L9).
By Theorem 5.5, we have t(L9) ∈ O(d2
d). Therefore, Algorithm 5.2 has a time
O(nd−1 log n). The claim follows by running the algorithm for n players.
Remark 5.7. Theorem 5.6 remains valid for arbitrary level structures of degree d as
long as h is logarithmic in n. If B is degenerate strict, Algorithm 5.2 has no polynomial
runtime.
Despite this generally positive result, the time complexity of computing the level structure
value may be too high in many cases. In practice, the degree of B must be very small,
even if n is not very large. Using the nested Shapley levels value may be often more
appropriate.
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Theorem 5.8. For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, and B of degree d, it requires to compute
ShNLi (N, v,B) for all players i ∈ N
(i) a time O(n2) if B is strict,
(ii) a time O(n log n) if B is totally strict.
Proof. We give a pseudocode algorithm based on Definition 4.4.
Algorithm 5.3. Compute ShNLi (N, v,B)
Input: A level structure B ∈ LN, B = Bh, a player i ∈ N , and v(S) for all S ∈ R
Shi
B .
1: v¯h+1i (N) := v(N)
2: for k = h to 0 do // the descending levels
3: v˜ki (B
k|Bk+1(i)) := v¯
k+1
i (B
k+1(i)) // the worth for the restricted grand coalition
where all children of Bk+1(i) are players
4: for all Q ( Bk|Bk+1(i), Q 6= ∅, do // all coalitions that the children of B
k+1(i)
as players can form, except Bk|Bk+1(i)
5: v˜ki (Q) := v(
⋃
B∈QB)
6: end for
7: v¯ki (B
k(i)) := ShBk(i)(B
k|Bk+1(i), v˜
k
i ) // calls a method/function that computes
Sh before the assignment, e.g. Algorithm 5.1
8: end for
9: ShNLi (N, v,B) := v¯
0
i ({i})
10: return ShNLi (N, v,B).
Complexity: (i) Let B be a strict level structure of degree d. We have
t(Algorithm 5.3) = 1 + t(F2) + 1 = ≤
Prop.5.1
2 + (n− 1)
[
1 + t(F4) + t(L7)
]
≤ 1 + n+ (n− 1)(2d − 2) + (n− 1)t(L7)
By Theorem 5.5, we have t(L7) ∈ O(d2
d). Therefore, Algorithm 5.3 has for a strict level
structure a time O(n). The claim follows by running the algorithm for n players.
(ii) Let B be a totally strict level structure of degree d. By Proposition 5.1, the for
loop, line 2, now runs at most log2 n times instead of (n− 2) times. Analogous to (i), it
follows
t(Algorithm 5.3) = 2 + log2 n+ log2 n(2
d − 2) + log2 n · t(L7)
By Theorem 5.5, we have t(L7) ∈ O(d2
d). Therefore, Algorithm 5.3 has for a totally strict
level structure a time O(log n). The claim follows by running the algorithm for n players.
Remark 5.9. As long as h is linear in n, Theorem 5.8 (i) remains valid and as long as h
is logarithmic in n, Theorem 5.8 (ii) remains valid for arbitrary level structures of degree
d. Again, the impact of d is not negligible in practice. Although, at least for small d, in
Algorithm 5.1, the faculties could be stored directly, resulting in a slightly better runtime
of O(2d) for Shi(D, v), the influence of d is still exponential.
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For ShNL only the relationships of the children within the parent are relevant. OwNL
also takes into account the relationships of the children of the parent to the siblings of
the parent with a runtime complexity of the same order.
Theorem 5.10. For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, and B of degree d, it requires to compute
OwNLi (N, v,B) for all players i ∈ N
(i) a time O(n2) if B is strict,
(ii) a time O(n log n) if B is totally strict.
Proof. We give a pseudocode algorithm based on Definition 4.9.
Algorithm 5.4. Compute OwNLi (N, v,B)
Input: A level structure B ∈ LN, B = Bh, a player i ∈ N , and v(S) for all S ∈ R
Owi
B .
1: if h = 0 then
2: OwNLi (N, v,B) := Shi(N, v) // calls a method/function that computes Sh
before the assignment, e.g. Algorithm 5.1
3: else // h ≥ 1
4: for all T ⊆ N, T =
⋃
B∈Bh,B⊆TB do // all coalitions that the components of
the hth level can form with their own complete player sets among themselves
5: v¯h+1i (T ) := v(T )
6: end for
7: for k = h to 1 do // the descending levels
8: for all Q ⊆ Bk|Bk+1(i) do // all coalitions that the children of B
k+1(i)
as players can form
9: v˜ki (Q) := v¯
k+1
i (
⋃
T∈Q T )
10: end for
11: v¯ki (B
k(i)) := ShBk(i)(B
k|Bk+1(i), v˜
k
i ) // calls a method/function that computes
Sh before the assignment, e.g. Algorithm 5.1
12: for all S ⊆ Bk(i), S =
⋃
B∈Bk−1,B⊆SB, do // all coalitions that the children of
Bk(i) can form with their own complete player sets among themselves
13: for all Q ⊆ Ski do // all subsets from the set containing all children of
Bk+1(i) where Bk(i) is replaced by coalition S (see Notation 4.8)
14: vki (Q) := v(
⋃
T∈Q T )
15: end for
16: v¯ki (S) := ShS(S
k
i , v
k
i ) // calls a method/function that computes Sh
before the assignment, e.g. Algorithm 5.1
17: end for
18: end for
19: for all Q ⊆ B0|B1(i) do // all coalitions that the components of the 0th
level, restricted to B1(i), as players can form
20: v˜0i (Q) := v¯
1
i (
⋃
T∈Q T )
21: end for
22: OwNLi (N, v,B) := v¯
0
i ({i})
23: end if
24: return OwNLi (N, v,B).
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Complexity: (i) Let B be a strict level structure of degree d. We have
t(Algorithm 5.4)
≤ t(IF1) + t(ELSE3) = 1 + t(L2) + t(F4) + t(F7) + t(F19) + 1
≤
Prop.5.1
2 + t(L2) + 2
d− 1 + (n− 2)
[
t(F8) + t(L11) + t(F12)
]
+ 2d− 1
≤ 2d+1 + t(L2) + (n− 2)
[
2d − 1 + t(L11) + (2
d − 1)
[
t(F13) + t(L16)
]]
≤ 2d+1 + t(L2) + (n− 2)
[
2d − 1 + t(L11) + (2
d − 1)
[
2d − 1 + t(L16)
]]
.
By Theorem 5.5, we have t(L2), t(L11), t(L16) ∈ O(d2
d). Therefore, Algorithm 5.4 has for
a strict level structure a time O(n). The claim follows by running the algorithm for n
players.
(ii) Let B be a totally strict level structure of degree d. By Proposition 5.1, the for
loop, line 7, now runs at most (log2 n − 1) times instead of (n − 2) times. Analogous to
(i), it follows
t(Algorithm 5.4) ≤ 2d+1 + t(L2)
+(log2 n− 1)
[
2d − 1 + t(L11) + (2
d − 1)
[
2d − 1 + t(L16)
]]
.
By Theorem 5.5, we have t(L2), t(L11), t(L16) ∈ O(d2
d). Therefore, Algorithm 5.4 has
for a totally strict level structure a time O(log n) and the claim follows by running the
algorithm for n players.
Remark 5.11. Theorem 5.10 (i) remains valid for arbitrary level structures of degree d
as long as h is linear in n, Theorem 5.10 (ii) remains valid for arbitrary level structures
of degree d as long as h is logarithmic in n. The effect of d is now quadratic to that of
d in Algorithm 5.3 (22d instead of 2d). Therefore, in practice, the maximum degree d can
now only be half as large as that used for ShNL to compute OwNL in a reasonable time.
6 Relevant coalition functions
In this section, we will look again at the Shapley levels value. By the dividend representa-
tion in (5), ShL equals, for a fixed player set and level structure, a Harsanyi solution from
the Harsanyi set (Hammer et al., 1977; Vasil’ev, 1978). Usually, we need the dividends
to compute a Harsanyi solution, which normally takes exponential time to calculate.
Theorem 6.1. Let (N, v) ∈ VN. To compute the dividends ∆v(T ) for all T ⊆ N requires
a time O(3n).
Proof. For the proof, we adapt the “dividend” algorithm in Algaba et al. (2007):
Algorithm 6.1. Compute ∆v
Input: (N, v) ∈ VN.
1: ∆v(∅) := 0
2: for ℓ = 1 to n do // gives the size of the coalitions
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3: for m = 1 to
(
n
ℓ
)
do // all coalitions of size ℓ
4:
∆v(Tℓm) := v(Tℓm)−
∑
S(Tℓm
∆v(S) // (1)
5: end for
6: end for
7: return ∆v(T ) for all T ⊆ N ,
where Tℓm is the mth coalition with |Tℓm | = ℓ.
Description: After the algorithm has computed the dividends of all singletons, the
dividends of the larger coalitions are successively computed using the dividends of the
smaller coalitions.
Complexity: We have
t(Algorithm 6.1) = 1 + t(F2) = 1 +
n∑
ℓ=1
t(F3) = 1 +
n∑
ℓ=1
(nℓ)∑
m=1
t(L4)
= 1 +
n∑
ℓ=1
(nℓ)∑
m=1
(1 + 2ℓ − 1) = 1 +
n∑
ℓ=1
(
n
ℓ
)
2ℓ =
n∑
ℓ=0
(
n
ℓ
)
2ℓ = 3n.
Therefore, Algorithm 6.1 has a time O(3n)
Rash implementation of (5) in an executable algorithm for the computation of ShL thus
requires exponential time. In the following, we will propose an explicit expression for the
Shapley levels value with a polynomial runtime for totally strict level structures of fixed
degree. Therefore, we generalize the concept of relevant coalitions.
Definition 6.2. Let (N, v) ∈ VN, R ⊆ ΩN, and vR such that vR(T ) := v(T ) for all T ∈ R
and ∆vR(S) = 0 for all S ∈ Ω
N\R. We call vR the (R-)relevant coalition function
for v and all T ∈ R are called (R-)relevant coalitions.
If we know the relevant coalitions and their number is not too large, the computation of
dividends for a relevant coalition function can be done efficiently.
Theorem 6.3. Let (N, v) ∈ VN and R ⊆ ΩN be the set of relevant coalitions for v. If
the number of all T ∈ R is bounded by a polynomial of degree k, computing all dividends
∆vR(T ) requires a time O(n
2k).
Proof. For the proof, we again adapt the “dividend” algorithm in Algaba et al. (2007).
Algorithm 6.2. Compute ∆vR
Input: vR(T ) for all T ∈ R.
1: for ℓ = 1 to n do // gives the size of the coalitions
2: for m = 1 to |Rℓ| do // all coalitions from R of size ℓ
3:
∆vR(Tℓm) := v
R(Tℓm)−
∑
S(Tℓm ,S∈R
∆vR(S) // (1)
4: end for
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5: end for
6: return ∆vR(T ) for all T ∈ R,
where Rℓ is the set of all coalitions from R of size ℓ and Tℓm is the mth coalition from
Rℓ.
Description: As in Algorithm 6.1, first the dividends of all singletons are computed and
then, successively, the dividends of larger coalitions using the dividends of the smaller ones.
Complexity: The number of summands in line 3 is bounded by a polynomial of degree
k. Thus, we have t(L3) ∈ O(n
k). The number of calls of line 3 by the two nested loops,
line 1, line 2, is bounded by a polynomial of degree k. It follows
t(Algorithm 6.2) = t(F1) =
n∑
i=ℓ
t(F2) =
n∑
ℓ=1
|Ri|∑
m=1
t(L3).
Therefore, Algorithm 6.2 has a time O(n2k).
For a totally strict level structure of degree d, the number of the RiB-relevant coalitions
is bounded by a polynomial of degree (d − 1). In fact, the time O(n2d−2) to compute
the dividends for all T ∈ RiB can still be improved if we take advantage of the special
structure of a level structure.
Theorem 6.4. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B be a totally strict level structure of degree d, and
vR
i
B be the RiB-relevant coalition function for v. Computing all dividends ∆(vRiB)(T ) for
all T ∈ RiB requires a time O
(
n
d
log3 2
)
.
Proof. For the proof, we look at a coalition function where all children of B1(i) and all
siblings of all ancestors of {i} are the players. All coalitions which these players can form
have the same worth as the corresponding previous coalitions. Thus, the dividends of
these new coalitions also match the corresponding original dividends. Since we have, by
Proposition 5.1, at most d+(log2 n−1)(d−1) = d log2 n+1 players, we need, by Theorem
6.1, a time O(3d log2 n+1) = O(n
d
log3 2 ) to compute all dividends.
The following alternative definition of ShL follows immediately by Remark 5.2 and (5).
Remark 6.5. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, vR
i
B be the RiB-relevant coalition function for v and
all i ∈ N, and KT (i) be the expressions from (4). Then the Shapley Levels value Sh
L is
given by
ShLi (N, v,B) =
∑
T∈Ri
B
, T∋i
KT (i)∆(
vR
i
B
)(T ) for all i ∈ N.
Also for an algorithm, based on an explicit expression, we have a polynomial runtime for
the Shapley levels value.
Theorem 6.6. For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN such that B is a totally strict level structure of
degree d, it requires to compute ShLi (N, v,B) for all players i ∈ N a time O
(
n
( d
log3 2
+1))
if
we use an algorithm based on (5).
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Proof. We give a pseudocode algorithm based on Remark 6.5 and thus based on (5).
Algorithm 6.3. Compute ShLi (N, v,B) with dividends
Input: A level structure B ∈ LN, B = Bh, a player i ∈ N , and v(T ) for all T ∈ R
i
B.
1: Compute ∆(
vR
i
B
)(T ) for all T ∈ RiB
2: sum := 0
3: for all T ∈ RiB, T ∋ i do // the relevant coalitions for player i
4: KT (i) := 1 // initialization
5: for r = 0 to h do // the levels
6: KT (i) := KT (i) ·
1
|{B ∈ Br : B⊆ Br+1(i), B ∩ T 6= ∅}|
// (4)
7: end for
8: sum := sum+KT (i)∆(
vR
i
B
)(T ) // sums up to (5)
9: end for
10: ShLi (N, v,B) := sum
11: return ShLi (N, v,B).
Complexity: Let B be a totally strict level structure of degree d. We have, according to
the proof of Theorem 5.6, h ≤ (log2 n) − 1 and |R
i
B| ≤ (2n
d−1 − 1). By Theorem 6.4, it
follows t(Line 1) ∈ O
(
n
d
log3 2
)
. We have t(L6), t(L8) ≤ c, c ∈ N, and obtain
t(Algorithm 6.3) = t(Line 1) + 1 + t(F3) + 1
≤ t(Line 1) + 2 + (2nd−1 − 1)
[
1 + t(F5) + t(L8)
]
≤
[
t(Line 1) + 2 + 2nd−1
[
1 + log2 n · c+ c
]]
∈ O
(
n
d
log3 2
)
.
The claim follows by running the algorithm for n players.
7 General reflections
In previous sections, an efficient payoff computation was possible because we did not have
to consider all coalitions in the LS-values examined. The same payoffs could also be
obtained if, in the related coalition functions, the relevant coalitions would receive their
original worth and the other coalitions a worth that results in a dividend of zero. Since
we can consider for any coalition function all essential coalitions as relevant, a simple
relationship emerges.
Remark 7.1. Let (N, v) ∈ VN. If we define R as the set of all essential coalitions in v,
we have v = vR.
For the LS-values, a certain perspective on the hierarchical structure was crucial to deter-
mine which coalitions were considered being relevant. Apart from a hierarchical structure,
in practice, there are often many other restrictions on the formation of coalitions: group
size, spatial restrictions such as rooms, buildings, and locations, or specific requirements
for certain members within a team such as military units, ship or aircraft crews, or de-
velopment and programming teams. In networks (no complete graph), we often have a
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direct or indirect connection within a fixed number of coalitions. Definition 6.2 allows the
formation of any relevant coalition that may actually or even theoretically be formed.
Relevant coalition functions have a close connection to graph and hypergraph games
in Deng and Papadimitriou (1994). A (undirected) hypergraph G = (N,E) consists
of a set N of nodes and a set E of non-empty subsets of N , called hyperedges. If
the hyperedges are only 2-element subsets of nodes, we call G a graph. Since the set of
nodes N corresponds to a player set N , we can also interpret each hyperedge S ∈ E as a
coalition S ∈ ΩN of players.
Deng and Papadimitriou define for a given undirected graph G = (N,E) with an integer
weight vG(S) on each edge S ∈ E a TU-game (N, vG) by vG(T ) :=
∑
S⊆T, S∈E vG(S) for
all T ⊆ N . They show that for such games the Shapley value for a player i ∈ N is
to compute by Shi(N, vG) =
1
2
∑
S∈E,S∋i vG(S), which results in time O(n
2) to compute
the Shapley value for the complete player set. In a first extension, the authors allow
games with an underlying hypergraph with weighted hyperedges of a fixed size k ≥ 2.
The coalition function vG is still given by vG(T ) :=
∑
S⊆T, S∈E vG(S) for all T ⊆ N .
Since the number of edges is polynomial in n, the Shapley value can be computed by
Shi(N, vG) =
1
k
∑
S∈E,S∋i vG(S) in polynomial-time.
In the last extension, the size of the hyperedges can vary as long as the number of hy-
peredges is polynomial in n. This extension is mentioned only rudimentarily. Therefore,
a small but for our further considerations significant lack of clarity in Deng and Papadim-
itriou (1994) should be pointed out. As long as we have no proper subset relationship
between hyperedges, by (1), the worth of a hyperedge in vG is equal to the Harsanyi
dividend of the corresponding coalition, all other coalitions have a dividend of zero, and
the worth of any coalition is equal to the sum of the worths of all hyperedges contained
in that coalition. But, if a hyperedge T ∈ E contains another hyperedge S ( T with a
non-zero weight as a proper subset, the worth of T cannot be the sum of the worths of S
and T simultaneously. Therefore, in the following, we define the weights on each hyper-
edge S ∈ E as the Harsanyi dividend ∆vG(S) and vG is given by vG(T ) :=
∑
S∈E ∆vG(S)
for all T ⊆ N . We believe that this is what Deng and Papadimitriou had in mind.
If we make a small generalization to hyperedges with arbitrary weights, allow that
singletons can also be hyperedges, and the number of hyperedges no longer has to be
polynomial in n, we have for each TU-game (N, vG) with G = (N,E) a corresponding
TU-game (N, vR) and vice versa such that E = R, ∆vG(S) = ∆vR(S) for all S ⊆ N , and
thus vG = v
R. In particular, we have vG = v if v = v
R (see Remark 7.1). While the
work of Deng and Papadimitriou was, in many respects, groundbreaking for the following
literature, this relationship seems to be little or not at all known in the literature so
far7. This correlation means that the representation in our small generalization is fully
expressive, i.e., it can model any TU-game!
In Deng and Papadimitriou (1994), the coalition function is given (in our generalization)
by the weights of the hyperedges and thus by the dividends of the relevant coalitions. It
follows, by the same arguments as in Deng and Papadimitriou (1994) and Remark 7.1,
that the Shapley value can be computed for all TU-games (N, v) in polynomial-time as
long as the number of all essential coalitions in v is polynomial in n and we know the
essential coalitions and their dividends. If the dividends for the essential coalitions are
7Ieong and Shoham, (2005, p. 194) and Michalak et al, (2013, p. 614/615), for example, only look at
graphs, which naturally are not fully expressive.
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not explicitly given, we can compute them in advance in polynomial-time according to
Theorem 6.3 using Algorithm 6.2. Note the following relationship.
Remark 7.2. Let (N, v) ∈ VN and R be the set of all essential coalitions in v. Then the
Shapley value Sh is given by
Shi(N, v) :=
∑
S∈R, S∋i
∆v(S)
|S|
for all i ∈ N.
It is clear from the outset which coalitions we consider as relevant for k-games and games
on hypergraphs. For level structures, we have determined which coalitions are relevant by
selecting an LS-value. We do this indirectly when we select a value for TU-games. The
equal surplus division value (Driessen and Funaki, 1991) is nothing else than the Shapley
value, calculated with the relevant coalition function where only the singletons and the
grand coalition are considered as relevant. The same applies to the proportional rule
(Moriarity, 1975) and the proportional Shapley value (Be´al et al., 2018; Besner, 2019a).
That is, if in fact only the singletons and the grand coalition are essential, we can still use
the axiomatizations of, say, the Shapley value to select a value, but then use the simple
formula of the equal surplus division value for the calculation. A very similar relationship
exists between the Shapley levels value and the other two LS-values examined.
Theorem 7.3. For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, we have
(i) ShNLi (N, v,B) = Sh
L
i (N, v
R
Shi
B ,B) and
(ii) OwNLi (N, v,B) = Sh
L
i (N, v
R
Owi
B ,B) for all i ∈ N ,
where RShiB is the set of relevant nested Shapley coalitions and R
Owi
B the set of relevant
nested Owen coalitions for player i.
By Theorem 7.3 and Remark 6.5, we immediately obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 7.4. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, vR
Shi
B be the RShiB -relevant coalition function, v
R
Owi
B
be the ROwiB -relevant coalition function for v and all i ∈ N, and KT (i) be the expressions
from (4). Then the nested Shapley Levels value ShNL and the nested Owen levels value
OwNL are given by
ShNLi (N, v,B) =
∑
T∈R
Shi
B
, T∋i
KT (i)∆(
vR
Shi
B
)(T ) and
OwNLi (N, v,B) =
∑
T∈R
Owi
B
, T∋i
KT (i)∆(
vR
Owi
B
)(T ) for all i ∈ N.
Suppose that the number of essential coalitions is polynomially bounded and we know
them and their worths or dividends. Then Remark 7.2 can serve as a blueprint for all
values from the Harsanyi set or for the TU-values from the generalized Harsanyi set
(Besner, 2020), for which the coefficients of the related dividends can then be computed
in polynomial-time, such as the proportional Shapley value or the proportional Harsanyi
solution (Besner, 2020). The representation of the Banzhaf value (Banzhaf, 1965) in van
den Brink and van der Laan (1998, Theorem 2.1) is also suitable.
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We know the essential coalitions especially in games where not only the grand coalition
but also other coalitions (in the same period) are actually formed. Here, the dividend
of the larger coalition that is formed is only added to the dividends of already formed
coalitions, which are part of this coalition. Not formed coalitions receive a zero dividend.
We are thinking, for example, of a cost function in which specific costs can be assigned to
a unit or cost center (dividends), and the coalitional worth of the cost center comprises
the sum of these costs and all costs of its sub-cost centers. Such situations are likely to
occur often in totally positive games (Vasil’ev, 1975), i.e., games in which all coalitions
have a non-negative dividend (see also the example in Besner (2020)).
8 Conclusion and discussion
In this paper, we have examined three different LS-values. Based on corresponding algo-
rithms, we could obtain polynomial runtimes for each value, depending on the structure
of the level structure. In principle, the results shown for the runtimes can also be trans-
ferred to weighted variants of our LS-values such as the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels
values. For the nested Owen levels value, we have only considered coalitions of children of
a parent with the siblings of the parent as relevant coalitions. Further extensions would
be if we would allow relevant coalitions also with siblings of the ancestors on any number
of levels. As long as this number of levels is logarithmic in n, we get polynomial runtimes.
All offered algorithms for LS-values can be executed for each player independently of
the others, so that parallel computing can improve the runtime in practice by up to a
factor n. However, the degree of the level structure remains the limiting factor. Of course,
the runtimes of LS-values that coincide with a value from the Harsanyi set for a fixed level
structure or use such a value in an intermediate game can also benefit from the restriction
to a set of relevant coalitions.
Sparse matrices require significantly less storage space in numerical analysis and scien-
tific computing and can help to use more efficient algorithms. Similarly, relevant coalition
functions can be regarded as advantageous for the values presented here. On the one
hand, we can solve problems caused by the huge representations, which are completely
useless in practice, and on the other hand, much shorter runtimes are required for payoff
computations. Just as there are specialized computers and algorithms for sparse matrices,
used especially in the field of artificial intelligence, the use of relevant coalition functions
could open up new areas of research and application for cooperative game theory.
The values, in this case for the relevant coalition functions, still satisfy their axioms,
such as efficiency, null player, additivity, etc., depending on the value, including perhaps
the most important axiom for practice, computational ease.
Even if the number of players is not too large, the worths of the coalitions of all possible
coalitions may not be known or determinable in a reasonable time, and it may not be
possible to store them appropriately. Although we would use approximation methods
for TU-values, we would finally have to agree on certain coalitions or subsets of the n!
orderings of the players and related worths of coalitions somehow, for example, based
on Monte Carlo simulation (see, e.g., Mann and Shapley (1960) and Stanojevic et al.
(2010)), the normal distribution function (see, e.g., Owen (1972)), or other in some way
randomized algorithms (see, e.g., Fatima et al. (2008) and van Campen et al. (2018)).
Based on Theorem 6.3, new approximation methods, which still need to be developed,
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may offer some advantages when using dividends and relevant coalition functions. On the
one hand, values for which only a definition with dividends is known or practicable, such
as most values from the Harsanyi set, can then be approximated; on the other hand, we
can specifically influence which coalitions are relevant. For example, all coalitions that
result from the restrictions listed in Section 7, such as group size, spatial restrictions, and
so on, are suitable. We can also consider relevant coalition functions, which define as
relevant coalitions only those for which data already exist or for which data are available
in a certain time period. The aim should be to agree on a set of relevant coalitions whose
number is limited by a polynomial in n. We assume that the grand coalition N is actually
forming. However, other situations are not excluded in principle but may require special
treatment to receive efficient payoffs.
Even if it seems inexact to use only a certain number of coalitions for the computation,
it is often better to use the important or actually forming coalitions additionally for the
payoff computation than to do without them completely when applying the equal division
value or the proportional rule, for example. We can interpret the value that uses the
relevant coalition function as a new value that considers only the relevant coalitions as the
important ones. The worths or dividends of non-relevant coalitions have not disappeared,
they have just been included in the coalition worths or dividends of the coalitions which
are the relevant supersets of them.
Such a superset always exists when the grand coalition is among the relevant coalitions.
For example, if we compute the proportional rule, the dividends of all coalitions with at
least two players are summarized in the dividend of the grand coalition if the singletons
and the grand coalition are the relevant coalitions. If we compute the Shapley levels value
for a player i ∈ N with Algorithm 6.3, the dividend of a coalition S ⊆ N that i forms
with other players outside the parent is always included in the dividend of the coalition
that consists of all children of the smallest component containing S, where each child
itself contains at least one player of S.
Altogether, the algorithms and methods presented in this study should give new im-
pulses for the practical application of methods of cooperative game theory, e.g., in supply
chain management, cost allocation, resource allocation to processes in operating systems,
resource allocation of virtual machines, network analysis, etc..
Acknowledgements We are grateful to Winfried Hochsta¨ttler for pointing out to us that it
should be possible to use level structures to obtain polynomial runtimes for values for cooperative
games and his helpful comments.
9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of Proposition 4.6
• E and LG but not N: Since Sh meets E0, it is easy to see that ShNL satisfies E.
LG also follows directly from the top-down distribution mechanism and since Sh
satisfies E0. With the help of a small example, we can see that N is not satisfied: Let
(N, uS, B) ∈ VL
N, N = {1, 2, 3}, B = B2 such that B
1 :=
{
{1, 2}, {3}
}
and uS be the
unanimity game with carrier S := {2, 3}. Player 1 is a null player in uS but we have
ShNL1 (N, uS, B) =
1
4
6= 0.
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• NBC: Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, and Bk, Bℓ ∈ B
r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that Bℓ ⊆
Br+1(Bk). It is well-known that Sh satisfies BC
0 and thus for each TU-game restricted
to a component of the (k + 1)th level where the components of the kth level are the
players. Therefore, by LG, NBC is satisfied for r = h. By induction on the size
m := h− r, (8), and LG, the claim follows immediately.
9.2 Proof of Theorem 4.7
The existence part follows by Proposition 4.6. Therefore, we only have to show uniqueness.
Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, and ϕ and ψ be two LS-values which satisfy E and
NBC. It is sufficient to show∑
i∈B
ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈B
ψi(N, v,B) for all B ∈ B
r and all r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1. (13)
If r = h+ 1, (13) is satisfied by E. We use a first induction I1 on the size m, 0 ≤ m ≤ h,
for all levels r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, where m := h− r.
Induction basis I1: Let m = 0 and thus r = h.
If |{B : B ∈ Bh}| = 1, (13) is satisfied by E. We use a second induction I2 on the size
t := |{B : B ∈ Bh}|, t ≥ 2.
Induction basis I2: Let t = 2. We have exactly two components Bk, Bℓ ∈ B
h. By E, it
follows ∑
i∈Bk
ϕi
(
N\Bℓ, v,Bh|N\Bℓ
)
=
∑
i∈Bk
ψi
(
N\Bℓ, v,Bh|N\Bℓ
)
and ∑
i∈Bℓ
ϕi
(
N\Bk, v,Bh|N\Bk
)
=
∑
i∈Bℓ
ψi
(
N\Bk, v,Bh|N\Bk
)
.
We obtain, by NBC,∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈Bk
ψi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈Bℓ
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈Bℓ
ψi(N, v,B).
It follows
2 ·
[∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈Bk
ψi(N, v,B)
]
=
∑
i∈N
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈N
ψi(N, v,B) =
E
0
and therefore, (13) is satisfied.
Induction step I2: Assume that (13) holds for t
′ ≥ 2 and all t′′, 1 ≤ t′′ < t′, (IH2). Let
t := t′ + 1. We choose two different components Bk, Bℓ ∈ B
h. It follows∑
i∈Bk
ϕi
(
N\Bℓ, v,Bh|N\Bℓ
)
=
(IH2)
∑
i∈Bk
ψi
(
N\Bℓ, v,Bh|N\Bℓ
)
and ∑
i∈Bℓ
ϕi
(
N\Bk, v,Bh|N\Bk
)
=
(IH2)
∑
i∈Bℓ
ψi
(
N\Bk, v,Bh|N\Bk
)
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We obtain, by NBC,∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈Bk
ψi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈Bℓ
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈Bℓ
ψi(N, v,B). (14)
(14) holds for all B ∈ Bh. It follows for an arbitrary B ∈ Bh,
t ·
[∑
i∈B
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈B
ψi(N, v,B)
]
=
∑
i∈N
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈N
ψi(N, v,B) =
E
0.
Therefore, (13) is satisfied. Note, since N and h were arbitrary, we have also shown, for
all 0 ≤ r ≤ h and two siblings Bk, Bℓ ∈ B
r,∑
i∈Bk
ϕi
(
Br+1(Bk)\Bℓ, v,Br|Br+1(Bk)\Bℓ
)
=
∑
i∈Bk
φi
(
Br+1(Bk)\Bℓ, v,Br|Br+1(Bk)\Bℓ
)
. (15)
Induction step I1: Assume that (13) holds for m
′, 0 ≤ m′ < h, and all m′′, 0 ≤ m′′ < m′,
(IH1). Let m = m
′ + 1, r = h−m′ − 1, Br+1 ∈ Br+1, and t := |{B ∈ Br : B ⊆ Br+1}|. If
t = 1, we have only one B ∈ Br, B ⊆ Br+1. It follows∑
i∈B
ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈Br+1
ϕi(N, v,B) =
(IH1)
∑
i∈Br+1
ψi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈B
ψi(N, v,B).
Let now t ≥ 2. We choose two siblings Bk, Bℓ ∈ B
r. We have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi
(
Br+1\Bℓ, v,Br|Br+1\Bℓ
)
=
(15)
∑
i∈Bk
ψi
(
Br+1\Bℓ, v,Br|Br+1\Bℓ
)
and ∑
i∈Bℓ
ϕi
(
Br+1\Bk, v,Br|Br+1\Bk
)
=
(15)
∑
i∈Bℓ
ψi
(
Br+1\Bk, v,Br|Bs+1\Bk
)
.
By NBC, we obtain∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈Bk
ψi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈Bℓ
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈Bℓ
ψi(N, v,B). (16)
(16) holds for all B ∈ Br, B ⊆ Br+1. It follows for an arbitrary B ∈ Br, B ⊆ Br+1,
t ·
[∑
i∈B
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈B
ψi(N, v,B)
]
=
∑
i∈Br+1
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈Br+1
ψi(N, v,B) =
(IH1)
0.
Thus, we have
∑
i∈B ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈B ψi(N, v,B) for all B ∈ B
r, B ⊆ Br+1, and, by the
induction argument, uniqueness is shown.
9.3 Proof of Proposition 4.12
• E and LG but not N: Since Sh meet E0 and Ow meet E, it is easy to see that OwNL
satisfies E. LG also follows directly from the top-down distribution mechanism and
since Sh meet E0 and Ow meet E. The following example shows thatN is not satisfied.
Let (N, uS, B) ∈ VL
N, B := B2, N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, with B
1 :=
{
{1, 2}, {3}, {4}
}
,B2 :={
{1, 2, 3}, {4}
}
, and be uS the unanimity game with carrier S := {2, 3, 4}. Player 1 is
a null player in uS but we have Ow
NL
1 (N, uS, B) =
1
8
6= 0.
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• NBOC: Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, Bk, Bℓ ∈ B
r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that Bℓ ⊆
Br+1(Bk). If r = h, (10) is satisfied by LG and since Sh meets BC
0. Let now r < h.
By (9), we have
OwNLBk (B
r, vr,Br)−OwBk
(
Br|Br+2(Bk), v
r,Brr+1|Br+2(Bk)
)
= OwNLBℓ (B
r, vr,Br)−OwBℓ
(
Br|Br+2(Bℓ), v
r,Brr+1|Br+2(Bℓ)
)
.
Since Ow as a special case of the Shapley levels value satisfies BC, it follows
OwNLBk (B
r, vr,Br)−OwBk
(
Br|Br+2(Bk)\Bℓ , v
r,Brr+1|Br+2(Bk)\Bℓ
)
= OwNLBℓ (B
r, vr,Br)−OwBℓ
(
Br|Br+2(Bℓ)\Bk , v
r,Brr+1|Br+2(Bℓ)\Bk
)
.
By Remark 4.11 and LG, the claim follows immediately.
9.4 Proof of Theorem 4.13
The existence part follows by Proposition 4.12. Therefore, we only have to show unique-
ness. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, h arbitrary, and ϕ and ψ be two LS-values which
satisfy E and NBOC. It is sufficient to show∑
i∈B
ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈B
ψi(N, v,B) for all B ∈ B
r and all 0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1. (17)
We use a first induction I1 on the levels starting with level h+ 1.
Induction basis I1: Let r = h+ 1. Then (17) is satisfied by E.
Induction step I1: Assume that (17) is satisfied for all r, 0 ≤ s < r ≤ h+ 1, (IH1).
Let Bs+1 ∈ Bs+1. We use a second induction I2 on the size t := |{B ∈ B
s : B ⊆ Bs+1}|.
Induction basis I2: Let t = 1. We have only one B ∈ B
s, B ⊆ Bs+1, and, by E, it
follows∑
i∈B
ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈Bs+1
ϕi(N, v,B) =
(IH1)
∑
i∈Bs+1
ψi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈B
ψi(N, v,B). (18)
Note that (18) holds also for all restricted cuts as in (10) with r = s.
Induction step I2: Assume that (17) holds for t
′ ≥ 1 and all 1 ≤ t′′ < t′, (IH2). Let
t := t′ + 1. We choose two siblings Bk, Bℓ ∈ B
s, Bk, Bℓ ⊆ B
s+1. It follows∑
i∈Bk
ϕi
(
Bs+2(i)\Bℓ, v,Bs+1|Bs+2(i)\Bℓ
)
=
(IH2)
∑
i∈Bk
ψi
(
Bs+2(i)\Bℓ, v,Bs+1|Bs+2(i)\Bℓ
)
and ∑
i∈Bℓ
ϕi
(
Bs+2(i)\Bk, v,Bs+1|Bs+2(i)\Bk
)
=
(IH2)
∑
i∈Bℓ
ψi
(
Bs+2(i)\Bk, v,Bs+1|Bs+2(i)\Bk
)
.
We obtain, by NBOC,∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈Bk
ψi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈Bℓ
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈Bℓ
ψi(N, v,B). (19)
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(19) holds for all B ∈ Bs, B ⊆ Bs+1. It follows for an arbitrary B ∈ Bs, B ⊆ Bs+1,
t ·
[∑
i∈B
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈B
ψi(N, v,B)
]
=
∑
i∈Bs+1
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈Bs+1
ψi(N, v,B) =
(IH1)
0.
Thus, we have
∑
i∈B ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈B ψi(N, v,B) for all B ∈ B
s, B ⊆ Bs+1, and, by the
induction argument, uniqueness is shown.
9.5 Proof of Theorem 7.3
Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, u := v
R
Shi
B , w := vR
Owi
B , and, for 0 ≤ k ≤ h, be T ki the set
from Notation 4.1 and Ski the set from Notation 4.8.
(i) By Definition 4.2, we have for ShLi (N, u,B) and all k, 0 ≤ k ≤ h, u¯
k
i (B
k(i)) =
ShBk(i)(B
k|Bk+1(i), u˜
k
i ), where u˜
k
i is given by
u˜ki (Q) =
{
u¯k+1i (B
k+1(i)), if Q = Bk|Bk+1(i),
u(
⋃
B∈QB) if Q ( B
k|Bk+1(i) by D
0.
Therefore, the claim follows by Remark 5.3 and (6) and (7) in Definition 4.4.
(ii) We denote w¯ki and w˜
k
i in Definition 4.9 by y¯
k
i and y˜
k
i respectively to distinguish
them from w¯ki and w˜
k
i in Definition 4.2. By Remark 5.4, it is sufficient to show w¯
k
i (B
k(i))
in Definition 4.2 equals y¯ki (B
k(i)) in Definition 4.9 for all k, 0 ≤ k ≤ h.
For this, we use induction on the size k, h ≥ k ≥ 0, and show additionally for a cki ∈ R
that
w¯ki (S) =


ShS(B
k|Bk+1(i), w˜
k
i ), if S = B
k(i),
ShS(S
k
i , w
k
i )) + c
k
i , if S ( B
k(i), S =
⋃
B∈Bk−1,B⊆SB,
w(S) + cki , if S ( B
k(i), S ∩ Bk−1(i) 6= ∅, S 6= Bk−1(i),
(20)
where wki is given by w
k
i (Q) = w(
⋃
S∈Q S) for all Q ⊆ S
k
i , and w˜
k
i by w˜
k
i (Q) =
w¯k+1i (
⋃
S∈Q S) for all Q ⊆ B
k|Bk+1(i).
Induction basis: Let k = h. By Definition 4.2 and for cki := 0, (20) is satisfied for
ShLi (N,w,B) since Sh satisfies D
0. Due to y˜hi = w˜
h
i , the claim is satisfied for k = h.
Induction step: Assume that (20) and the claim are satisfied for k′, 1 ≤ k′ ≤ h, (IH).
Let k := k′ − 1.
By Definition 4.2, (20), and (IH), we have w¯ki (B
k(i)) = ShBk(i)(B
k|Bk+1(i), w˜
k
i ), where
w˜ki (Q) is given by
w˜ki (Q) =
{
w¯k+1i (B
k+1(i)) = y¯k+1i (B
k+1(i)) if Q = Bk|Bk+1(i),
y¯k+1i (
⋃
S∈Q S) + c
k+1 if Q ( Bk|Bk+1(i),
We define a game (Bk|Bk+1(i), w˚
k
i ) by
w˚ki (Q) =
{
0 if Q = Bk|Bk+1(i),
ck+1 if Q ( Bk|Bk+1(i),
30
In this game, all players are symmetric. Since Sh satisfies S0 and E0, each player gets a
payoff of zero in this game with Sh. We have w˜ki = y˜
k
i + w˚
k
i . By Definition 4.9 and since
Sh satisfies A0, it follows y¯ki (B
k(i)) = w¯ki (B
k(i)).
By (IH), we have
w¯k+1i (T ) =
{
ShT (T
k+1
i , w
k+1
i ) + c
k+1
i , if T ( B
k+1(i), T =
⋃
B∈Bk,B⊆TB,
w(T ) + cki , if T ( B
k+1(i), T ∩ Bk(i) 6= ∅, T 6= Bk(i).
We define w˘k+1i by
w˘k+1i (T ) :=
{
w¯k+1i (T )− w(T ), if T ( B
k+1(i), T =
⋃
B∈Bk,B⊆TB,
ck+1, if T ( Bk+1(i), T ∩ Bk(i) 6= ∅, T 6= Bk(i).
It follows, w¯k+1i = w + w˘
k+1
i . Therefore, by Definition 4.2 and, since Sh satisfies A
0, we
have w¯ki (S) = ShS(S
k
i , w
k
i )) + c
k
i , if S ( B
k(i), S =
⋃
B∈Bk−1,B⊆SB, and, since Sh satisfies
additionally D0, w¯ki (S) = w(S) + c
k
i , if S ( B
k(i), S ∩ Bk−1(i) 6= ∅, S 6= Bk−1(i). The
claim follows by induction.
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